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Abstract
This paper reviews both the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical ev-
idence in support of the under-provision of general training. In spite of many
theoretical reasons for the realization of inefficient levels of training, it is diffi-
cult to find convincing empirical evidence. Taking as a starting point the large
empirical literature showing that employers provide and pay for general training,
we argue that, if firms invest in general training, important evidence on under-
provision can be obtained by looking at the relationship between investment in
training and turnover. Using the 7 waves (1995-2001) of the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP) for 12 European countries, we find a negative
but not statistically significant relationship between training and turnover. We
conclude that, at the current state of the knowledge, it is difficult to justify train-
ing policies widespread in many European countries using efficiency arguments.
Keywords: training, efficiency, turnover
1. Introduction
Human capital, accumulated at school or in the labor market, is a key determinant
of wages and employment opportunities (Lynch, 1992; Bishop, 1997; Arulampalam
and Booth, 2001; OECD, 1999; Dearden et al., 2006; Ok and Tergeist, 2003) and
an important factor affecting economic growth (De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002;
OECD, 2001). Skill upgrading and the avoidance of skill obsolescence are relevant
features of policies designed to increase labor market participation and the length
of the working life and to reduce the social exclusion of particular groups and the
consequences of population ageing.
Since many professional activities require skills that can only be acquired by
direct experience, substantial investment in human capital takes place on-the-job
rather than at schools or in specialized institutions. In this paper we focus on general
training provided by firms. Many empirical studies show that there is substantial
variation across countries and across socio-economic groups in training participation
rates, with Nordic countries showing higher participation than Southern European
countries (Ok and Tergeist, 2003) and low-educated and older workers generally
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participating less than other groups in training activities. Are these differences due to
inefficiencies? More generally, do enterprises and workers invest enough in training?
Under - provision can only be defined with respect to a benchmark. The natural
benchmark is the efficient level of training, which maximizes total output net of
training costs. Equality of (private and social) marginal benefits and marginal costs
does not imply that the efficient level of training is the same across different groups of
individuals or countries. For instance, the poorly educated may face higher training
costs because education and training are complements. Given marginal benefits,
this group should receive less training. Therefore, the observation that the poorly
educated receive less training than the better educated is not by itself evidence of
inefficient under-provision. Of course, the level of training of individuals with lower
educational attainment might be depressed below the first best level by other factors,
such as higher turnover rates, which reduce investments in general training, and more
binding liquidity constraints. Similarly, some countries might invest too little in
training because of labor market institutions or imperfect capital markets. In these
situations we might have a case for under-investments, since they are characterized
by aspects that, according to human capital theory, may hinder individuals from
investing efficiently.
Even if Becker’s work (1962, 1964) on human capital investments has strongly
influenced all the subsequent literature, some important differences emerge in re-
lation to the hypothesis adopted on labour market competition. Becker, assuming
perfectly competitive labour markets, extends the efficiency result (guaranteed by
the working of free market forces) also to this type of investment. Some exceptions
come into view when individuals are liquidity constrained (problems related to the
capital market) or when there are legal constraints, such as minimum wages, which
do not allow workers to accept a sufficiently low initial wage. Conversely, inefficient
results are typical of those analysis considering imperfectly competitive labour mar-
kets. In this kind of labour markets the investing subject is not able to obtain the full
return on his investment and consequently social returns do not coincide with private
ones. Moreover, when the investing subject is the firm, training returns are reduced
by turnover, which generate a positive externality to other firms.
Although there are many theoretical reasons for under-investment, it is difficult
to find direct empirical evidence on this phenomenon, mainly because training costs
and returns - on which efficiency evaluations are based - are hardly ever measured. In
spite of the scant empirical evidence on training under-investment, training policies
aimed at increasing investments realized both by firms and workers are widespread
in many OECD countries. Schemes directed to firms usually consist in levy schemes
which require firms to pay a tax and obtain resources to award grants to support train-
ing (levy-grant schemes, diffused in Belgium, Spain and Italy), or which impose on
firms to pay a tax if they do not meet a pre-determined level of training (train-or-pay
schemes adopted in France and in the province of Quebec, Canada). In other cases,
for example in Austria (in 2000), Italy (in 2001) and Luxembourg (in 1999), firms
are allowed to deduct some or all training costs and thereby to reduce corporate taxes
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(see OECD 2003a). Quite diffuse are also schemes directed to individuals. Loans
financing adult learning have been introduced in US and UK, while an increasing
number of countries are experimenting different types of subsides. Training vouch-
ers are used in certain regions of Austria, Italy and Switzerland, while individual
learning accounts, consisting in saving accounts that can be opened by individuals
to fund training activities, with contribution from third parties (government and em-
ployer), are experimented in Canada, the Netherlands, the Basque region of Spain,
the United Kingdom and the United States (for a review see OECD 2003b).
In discussing the empirical evidence on training under-investment we will show
that there is not a strong efficiency argument on which these policies can be based. In
addition, while evaluations of training interventions and other active labour market
policies directed to unemployment are becoming frequent also in European coun-
tries, costs and benefits of training policies directed to firms and employed workers
are mainly unknown, since rigorous evaluations are missing.
In this paper we investigate the under-investment issue by looking at the re-
lationship between training and turnover. If training increases turnover and labor
markets are imperfectly competitive the private marginal benefit to the current firm-
worker pair is unambiguously below the social one. This is non necessarily the case
if training reduces turnover, since this effect may compensate other sources of under-
provision and close or even eliminate the gap between efficient and actual training
outcomes. We investigate this issue using the 7 waves (1995-2001) of the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 12 European countries. However, we do
not find any conclusive evidence, since the estimated relationship between employer
- provided training and subsequent turnover is negative but not statistically signifi-
cant. We conclude that even if the risk of poaching may actually represent a factor
preventing the realization of an efficient level of investment in training, the empirical
evidence at hand is not sufficiently informative to support training policies. Much
more should be known before designing effective policies.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents a theoretical
model which highlights the different causes of under-provision. Section three dis-
cusses the available empirical evidence. In section four, using data from ECHP, we
investigate the relationship between training and separation rates. Section five offers
some concluding remarks.
2. The under-provision of training: theory
In this section we present a theoretical framework to discuss the investment in gen-
eral training both in the case of perfectly competitive labor markets and in the case of
labor market imperfections. The aim is that of illustrating different causes of train-
ing under-investment - by restricting attention to general training. There is a broad
agreement that under-investment problems are especially relevant for this type of
training, since externalities generating under-investment become less relevant when
training is more specific.
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Assume that firms are identical and that individuals live and work for two peri-
ods. Training takes place during the first period, when both productivity and wages
are equal to zero, and is completely general. Productivity and wages in the second
period are denoted respectively by y and w. In addition, we assume that in the sec-
ond period there is an instantaneous probability of separation denoted by q. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume a discount factor equal to one. Optimality requires
choosing an amount of training such as any further increase in training would imply
a marginal increase in output smaller than the corresponding marginal increase in
costs:
y′(s) = c′(s) (1)
In a perfectly competitive labour market, the worker obtains a wage equal to the
marginal product. Since the investment in general human capital increases the re-
cipient’s productivity in all firms operating in the market, the firm currently employ-
ing the worker will not be prepared to finance this kind of investment. As shown
by Becker (1962) because workers fully capture the benefits of training via higher
wages, they will finance the investment in general skills and pay for it either directly
or by accepting lower wages during the training period1. The level of investment
realized by the worker will be efficient, in fact training will produce a wage increase
equal to the increase in productivity, and the worker’s choice will satisfy the follow-
ing condition:
w′(s) = y′(s) = c′(s) (2)
In this framework there is under-provision of training if liquidity or legal con-
straints, such as minimum wages, do not allow workers to accept a sufficiently low
initial wage. Under-provision also emerges when individuals are not fully rational
or perfectly informed. These problems might be more relevant for certain groups of
workers than for others. For example, low-income workers might be particularly af-
fected by credit constraints, or might be unable to collect information about training
returns.
Additional problems emerge if returns to training are uncertain, either because
of shocks to the demand of particular competencies or because of uncertainty about
1In the beckerian framework the distinction between firm specific and general human capital plays
a crucial role in defining who bears the investment cost. When training is firm specific, the costs and
revenues are shared by the worker and the firm. This result is based on the fact that the investment is lost if
the worker and the firm separate after training. In contrast with the case of general training in a perfectly
competitive labor market, this creates a wedge between worker’s productivity - which increases with
training- and outside option - which does not. To avoid quits the firm is willing to pay the trained worker
a wage higher than her outside option. However, the optimal wage (from the point of view of the firm) will
be somewhere between the worker’s productivity and her outside option; therefore, the optimal contract
implies that costs are shared as well. Hashimoto (1981), considering the case of asymmetric information,
formally shows that the shares of cost paid by the firm and the worker depend on the relationship between
quit rates and wages, layoff rates and profits, and on other variables such as the cost of funds and the
attitude toward risk of the parties involved. He also shows that the level of training investment is ex-ante
efficient, even in the presence of ex-post inefficient turnover.
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the ability to acquire a certain qualification or skill level. Since workers are unlikely
to obtain insurance against these types of risk they may be discouraged to invest in
training (Layard, Robinson and Steedman, 1995).
Clearly the efficient level of training emerging from Becker analysis holds only
if the firm can credibly commit to the investment level the worker is paying for. Dif-
ficulties in measuring and verifying training quantity and quality pose very relevant
problems of opportunism, which have been considered both in relation to specific
investments (Williamson, 1975; Hashimoto, 1981; Prendergast, 1993; Kahn and Hu-
berman, 1988; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993) and in relation to investments in
general human capital financed by workers (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a; Mal-
comson, Maw and McCormick, 2002). In addition, these problems may aggravate
the conflicting interests of employers and employees concerning the type of skills
(general or specific) to be provided (Stevens, 1994)2. Workers might be discouraged
to invest in human capital since they are skeptical about the skills provided by the
firm being sufficiently general to ensure a high productivity and wages in other firms.
As recently stressed by a number of papers (Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and Pis-
chke, 1998, 1999a,b), new sources of inefficiency emerge with imperfectly competi-
tive labor markets. In this environment, firms may be willing to bear some or all the
costs of providing general training if the increase of productivity induced by training
is higher than the wage increase, that is, if there is wage compression3. The di-
vergence between productivity and wages might arise for several reasons, including
mobility costs, search and matching frictions, the complementarity between general
and specific skills, and asymmetric information. As reviewed by Leuven (2005) we
can distinguish between two cases of information asymmetries: first, the training
firm is better informed than the market about the skills acquired by its employees;
second, the training firm is better informed about the abilities of its workers, which
gives rise to adverse selection. All these imperfections reduce the outside option of
workers investing in training. As shown by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a,
1999b, 2003) they turn general skills into de facto specific skills.
To illustrate, let us consider the above analytical framework and for the sake of
simplicity let us assume that the firm is the only investing subject. Privately optimal
training investment s is decided by each firm in the market to maximize the following
profit function, where q is the exogenous instantaneous probability of separation:
(1 − q) [y(s) − w(s)] − c(s) (3)
Therefore profit maximization implies choosing a level of training such as the
2Enforcement problems and imperfections in the training market often go together with imperfectly
competitive labor market. In fact, if training is difficult to verify for subjects external to the employment
relationship, the worker’s outside option will be below his productivity. It is, however, possible to have
perfectly competitive labour markets but workers who do not trust the firm in providing the promised level
of training and as a consequence do not undertake efficient investments.
3Booth and Zoega (2004) clarify the distinction between absolute and relative wage compression and
show that only absolute wage compression constitutes a necessary condition for firms to invest in general
training.
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marginal increase in returns, which occur only with probability (1 − q), is equal to
the marginal increase in costs:
(1 − q) [y′(s) − w′(s)] = c′(s) (4)
where the primes are for first derivatives. The firm will invest in training if the
post-training productivity increases in training intensity at a faster rate compared to
the wage. The comparison of (1) and (4) shows that each firm in this market under-
invests in training if w′(s) > 0 - that is if wages increase with training - because it
cannot reap all the returns to the training investment. Moreover, training is negatively
affected by the probability of quitting q > 0 and by poaching, which occurs when
the productivity after training at the new firm is higher than the outside option.
From (4) it is possible to see that employer provided training increases with the
monopsonistic power of the firm. It is relevant to notice that the firm’s monopsonistic
power might differ across different types of workers4. For example, some workers
might be more affected by adverse selection problems or, due to the type of tasks
they manage, might have a more firm-specific human capital. Besides, according
to this approach wage compression might be induced also by institutional features,
such as minimum wages and union wage bargaining, which lead to theoretical pre-
dictions that are in sharp contrast with those derived from Becker’s analysis. The
interest of firms in financing general skill acquisition by workers is greater when,
as a result of monopsonistic power or institutional regulations, the wage structure
is more distorted. For example, unionization can increase training by improving
the commitment on wage contracts and reducing the hold up problem (Ryan, 1994;
Booth, Francesconi and Zoega, 2003), or by playing a relevant role in reducing labor
turnover (Blau and Kahn, 1983; Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Booth and Chatterji,
1998); or by reducing the dispersion of wages between trained and un-trained em-
ployees5. As argued by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) a positive effect on training
may also derive from minimum wages. Since firms have to pay the minimum wage
even to their unskilled workers, firms may find it convenient to invest in training to
increase the productivity of less skilled workers. According to Fella (2005) a sim-
ilar effect may emerge also from employment protection. In fact, since investment
in general training increases the worker’s productivity outside the training firm, the
latter might be interested in investing in training to save firing costs in the case of
4As argued by De Paola and Scoppa (2003), better educated workers can also have highly dispersed
abilities - because acquiring education not only improves skills but also makes them more variable -
which, in the case of adverse selection problems, translate into lower outside options and in a higher
incentive for firms to invest in their human capital. Booth and Zoega (2000) show that firms’ incentives
to invest in general training are increasing in task complexity. Workers’ heterogeneous observable innate
ability affects the variety of tasks which can be performed within a firm and generates monopsony power
to firms with a ’better’ workforce. Since the degree of monopsony power is increasing in task complexity,
firms with a workforce involved in more sophisticated tasks are more willing to finance general training.
5On the other hand, unions may want to push for equality in the provision of training, with nega-
tive consequences on overall training investment, which goes beyond the training of the less advantaged
groups. In addition, unions often oppose the introduction of new technologies requiring skill up-grading
and by so doing indirectly oppose training.
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dismissals. The reason is that the firing cost is bargained between the parties, and is
lower the higher the outside option available to the worker6.
To complete our analysis suppose now that both the firm and the worker invest
in training and let the share of training costs born by the employee be σ ∈ (0, 1).
Training is fully contractible. In case of separation let us suppose that the firm
outside option is zero, while the worker’s outside option is v(s). Denoting with β
the worker’s bargaining power, the wage resulting from Nash bargaining will be
w(s) = v(s)+β (y(s) − v(s)). While the first best still require that (1) holds, the firm’s
choice is given by the condition:
(1 − q) (1 − β) [y′(s) − v′(s)]) = (1 − σ)c′(s) (5)
and the worker’s choice satisfies
v′(s) + (1 − q)β [y′(s) − v′(s)] = σc′(s) (6)
Since the total marginal returns of training of both the firm and the worker are
equal to (1 − q)y′(s) + qv′(s), if parties can commit on training levels, the efficient
solution can be reached only when this return is equal to y′(s), as in the following:
(1 − q)y′(s) + qv′(s) = y′(s) (7)
which can be written as
qv′(s) = qy′(s) (8)
which is verified either with q = 0, or when v′(s) = y′(s). In the latter case
the employee bears all the costs and reaps all the returns to training. Therefore,
σ must be equal to 1 and we are back to Becker’s case. On the contrary, when
v′(s) < y′(s) both the worker and the firm under-invest (see Acemoglu, 1997). In
fact, the worker gets less than his marginal product in the future job, which gener-
ates under-investment. The investment realized by the firm is also inefficient, since
turnover creates positive training externalities. If quit rates are positive and firms in
the market pay less than productivity, outside firms earn a profit from training, which
is not considered by training firms when deciding whether to invest7. This poaching
externality reduces the incentive to train (see Stevens, 1996; Katz and Zidermann,
1990).
6Arulampalam and Booth (1998) investigate the nexus between work-related training and labor market
”flexibility” and suggest that there is a trade-off between expanding marginal forms of employment and
expanding the proportion of the workforce getting work-related training. Therefore, the emphasis on the
need to increase flexibility in the labor market might not be compatible with the increase in the stock of
work-related skills by workers.
7An alternative view has been offered by Booth and Zoega (1999) who have argued that when there
is uncertainty about future productivity, a higher quit rate reduce the importance of future flows and the
option value of waiting rather than training.
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An important aspect missing from the above analysis is that training can affect
turnover. Letting q′(s) be the marginal change of turnover induced by training, con-
dition (7) can be re-written as follows
(1 − q)y′(s) + qv′(s) − q′(s)y(s) + q′(s)v(s) = y′(s) (9)
or
−q′(s) [y(s) − v(s)] = q [y′(s) − v′(s)] (10)
In this case, the first best solution cannot be excluded a priori when q′(s) is
negative. If the firm is the only investing subject this condition becomes:
−q′(s) [y(s) − v(s)] = y′(s)
[
q(1 − β) + β
1 − β
]
+ (1 − q)v′(s) (11)
A first best solution may emerge in this case if training reduces turnover. For
example, if firms cannot commit ex-ante to the wage they will pay to the trained
worker and wages are set to maximize ex-post profits, a trade-off between high wages
and low turnover rates emerges. In these circumstances, firms can use training as a
commitment device to reduce turnover. Therefore, with ex-post wage determination,
it is not possible to rule out training over-investment. This can be seen in equation
(9) when q′(s) is allowed to be negative.
The prediction of the theoretical literature with respect to the influence of train-
ing on turnover rates is mixed. According to Jansen (1998), skills acquisition makes
workers more apt to adjust to higher flexibility and reduces the probability of sep-
arations induced by negative shocks. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) assume that
training does not affect turnover. On the other hand, as argued by Black and Lynch
(1998) ”training itself may contribute to employee turnover: if new skills are of value
to other employers then firms risk having their trained employee hired away”.
In order to show that the effect of training on turnover can be either negative or
positive, suppose that the worker’s outside option is equal to v(s)+ ε, where v(s) is a
deterministic variable and ε is a stochastic variable uniformly distributed in the range
[−k(s),+k(s)](with density function f (ε) = 1/2k(s)). This specification is based on
the idea that not only the worker’s outside option increases with training but also
that shocks that hit his outside option are related to the training level. This could
be because training increases the range of opportunities available to the worker, by
raising access to new job offers and self-employment opportunities.8
In this case the probability of separation q is endogenous, since the worker will
stay with the current firm only if his outside option is lower than the wage he receives
8An alternative way is to assume that the arrival rate of job offers increases with training, for example
because workers are more able to individuate adequate job opportunities. If we denote with λ(s) the
arrival rate of job offers and with ε the shock hitting the worker’s outside option, which has a distribution
function G(ε) and mean zero, then the expected value of the worker outside option is λ(s)v(s) and the
worker will leave when λ(s)v(s) > w(s). The probability of quitting is q = G [λ(s)v(s) − w(s)], from
which ∂q∂s = g (λ(s)v
′(s) − w′(s) + λ′(s)v(s)), which may result either positive or negative.
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in the current firm, which, as above, we assume to be the outcome of Nash bargain-
ing. Formally the worker will remain with the firm when v(s) + ε < v(s) + β[y(s) −
v(s)], which occurs with probability Prob{ε < β[y(s) − v(s)]} = Prob{ε < β[z(s)]}.






dε = 1− β[y(s) − v(s)] + k(s)
2k(s)
=
k(s) − β[y(s) − v(s)]
2k(s)
(12)
This probability can both increase or decrease with training. In the former case,
the marginal benefits of training decline, with negative effects on the investment,





k′(s) − β [y′(s) − v′(s)]} 2k(s) + {k(s) − β [y(s) − v(s)]} 2k′(s)
[2k(s)]2
(13)
If k′(s) = 0, (13) becomes ∂q
∂s =
−β[y′(s)−v′(s)]
k(s) and, since with wage compression[
y′(s) − v′(s)] > 0, the probability of quitting falls when training increases, with
positive effects on training investment. However, this is not the case when k′(s) is
positive, since training now increases the variability of the worker’s outside option.
3. The under - provision of training: empirical evidence
The empirical literature on training suffers of measurement problems that hinder
the achievement of ultimate conclusions. Training incidence and duration is usually
measured using data drawn from household and employer surveys and from adminis-
trative data of single firms. These data contain self-reported training measures, which
are affected by measurement errors because respondents may not exactly remember
all their relevant training experiences, especially when the span of time between the
training spell and the interview is long. Moreover, workers and firms may have dif-
ferent perceptions of training investments. As argued by Black and Lynch (1998)
”..a supervisor who is assigned to work side-by-side with a new employee may view
the time she spends with a new hire as training, whereas the employee views the fact
that the supervisor is always hanging around as monitoring, not training”. Barron
et al. (1997) using data from a matched employer-employee survey, find that the
correlation between worker and establishment measures are lower than 0.5 and that
establishments report on average 25 percent more hours of training than workers do.
These problems and the fact that informal training is rarely recorded in any sur-
vey makes it difficult to test human capital theory of training. As far as the under -
provision of training is concerned, an additional complication is that training costs
and returns - on which efficiency evaluations are based - are very difficult to mea-
sure. On the one hand, individual productivity is hardly ever measured and the wage,
which should approximate productivity, varies with many other factors, including la-
bor market competition. On the other hand, respondents to surveys are unlikely to
know the opportunity cost of training and when training is financed by the firm and
9
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the respondents are workers, it is also difficult to assess the direct money cost of
training.
Leaving aside these problems, a number of attempts has been made to evaluate
the extent of under-provision, mainly based on training returns. According to some
authors, the under-investment argument finds support in the combination of high
private rates of return to training and low training incidence. Returns to training have
usually been evaluated considering the effect of training on wages. Studies by Booth
and Bryan (2007), Frazis and Loewenstein (1999), Arulampalam, Booth and Elias
(1997), Mincer (1996), Blanchflower and Lynch (1994), suggest that private rates
of return to training are considerably higher than the real rate of return of corporate
bonds - 4 percent - and to schooling - about 5-10 percent (Bishop, 1994). Frazis and
Lowenstein find that 40 hours of training increase the wages of persons with low
levels of tenure and experience by 8 percent, as much as a single year of education.
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) report that the return to private sector training in the
US ranges between 16 and 26 percent. Evidence that the private returns to training
are disproportionately high relative to other investments with similar risk suggests
that there is some market failure, which prevents individuals from implementing their
privately optimal plans. According to Lengermann (1996) since workers generally
do not experience reductions in wage rates or hours worked while they received
company training, their private rate of return to training tends to be infinite. This
might explain the large numbers of American, Canadian, Dutch and Swedish workers
reporting that they are unable to get all the training they would like (Loewenstein and
Spletzer, 1999).
However, these estimates may be over-stated due to difficulties in controlling for
self-selection of individuals to treatment. Some recent studies, which use more ade-
quate instruments to control for selectivity, find lower returns. For example, training
returns not significantly different from zero are found by Leuven and Oosterbeek
(2002), who estimate the wage returns to work-related training by restricting the
group of untreated individuals to those who were willing to receive training in the
Netherlands, but did not do so due to some random event. Nevertheless, these re-
sults are based on a small sample and only thanks to new research going in the same
direction we would be able to reach any general conclusion.
An additional problem of evaluations based on wages is that wage returns depend
on the labour market structure. If firms have monopsonistic power, we may observe
low wage returns even if training substantially increases productivity. Due to the
lack of data on productivity, studies analysing the impact of training on productivity
are fewer compared to studies focusing on wage effects. These studies find mixed
results: on the one hand Zwick (2005) for Germany, Brunello (2004) and Conti
(2005)9 for Italy and Dearden et al. (2006) for UK, find a positive effect of training
on productivity, while on the other hand, Black and Lynch (2001), using US data, do
9Conti (2005), using a variety of panel data techniques, shows that training has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on productivity, robust to several estimation strategies, while the effect on wages is much less
robust, and smaller in size.
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not find any effect.
However, even in case of high returns, studies missing data on training costs can-
not reach definite conclusions on market failures. In fact, assuming that the marginal
returns to training decrease with the stock invested, high observed returns are con-
sistent both with the presence of market failures, which keep individuals and firms
from investing efficiently, and with high marginal costs of training. While the former
explanation supports under-provision, the latter explanation is perfectly in line with
efficient provision. To reach ultimate conclusions it is necessary to have informa-
tion on both benefits and costs. Recently, some studies, going in this direction, have
tried to evaluate the employer’s internal rate of return on investments in training (see
Bartel, 2000, for a review). However, these investigations are mainly company case
studies and their results can hardly be generalized. An exception is represented by a
study conducted by Almeida and Carneiro (2006), using data from a sample of Por-
tuguese firms. They estimate a joint rate of return for the employer and the employee
of 10%, which, however, varies considerably depending on the assumption made on
depreciation rates.10
According to another line of investigation, instead of trying to directly evaluate
whether the realized investments are efficient, important information can be obtained
by looking for evidence suggesting market failures. While there is little if any evi-
dence in support of under-provision because of liquidity constraints (see Messer and
Wolter, 200911), there is substantial evidence that the costs of training are financed
by the employer, which can be read as an indicator of monopsony power (Barron,
Berger and Black, 1999; Booth and Bryan, 2007; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998;
Stevens, 1999). The willingness of firms to bear training costs could be due, however,
to the firm - specific nature of the investment rather than to market power. The avail-
able empirical evidence suggests that skills provided by (formal) on-the-job training
are seldom purely firm-specific (Neal 1995; Stevens 1994, 1999; Loewenstein and
Spletzer, 1999), which points again to labor market imperfections. As documented
by Bishop (1997), a growing number of firms are training their workers in com-
pletely general skills such as mathematics, reading, writing, problem solving and
interpersonal skills. Similarly, OECD (2003a) reports that courses occurring outside
the workplace impart essentially general skills.
The fact that firms pay for general training is also supported by the empirical lit-
erature investigating the influence of labour market institutions, such as the presence
of unions and minimum wages, on training provision. The insignificant or posi-
tive effect of minimum wages on training provision found by a number of empirical
works (Lazear and Miller, 1981; Acemoglu and Pischke, 2003; Arulampalam, Booth
and Bryan, 2004; Grossberg and Sicilian, 1999) is not consistent with the becke-
rian approach while is consistent with models predicting that firms pay for general
10We are not aware of any study trying to evaluate the external effects of training.
11These authors analyse through a randomized experiment the effect of vouchers for adult learning.
They show that the voucher had a significant effect on training participation, especially for individuals
with low educational attainement.
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training. Similarly, the positive effect of unions on training emerging from a large
number of analysis might be interpreted in relation to the role of unions in reducing
turnover rates and in internalizing poaching externalities (Booth, 1991; Greenhalgh
and Mavrotas, 1994; Lynch, 1992; Green, 1993; Kennedy at al. 1994; Arulam-
palam and Booth, 1998; Green, Machin and Wilkinson 1999, Booth, Francesconi
and Zoega, 2003).
This empirical evidence, supporting the assumption of imperfectly competitive
labor markets, confirms an under provision problem. However, there are two main
objections to this line of reasoning. Firstly, the fact that firms formally pay for train-
ing does not imply that workers do not bear the cost through lower wages (as show
before with β = 1 investments are efficient). Secondly, a part from influencing pro-
ductivity and wages, training might reduce separation rates. in this case both firms
and workers will be induced to invest more and, even with imperfectly competitive
labor markets, an efficient solution cannot be excluded.
As far as the first objection is concerned, when workers invest, we should observe
a positive relationship between wage premia and training. Several papers investi-
gate the relationship between training and wage compression and do not support
this claim (Brunello, 2004; Ericson, 2004; Almeida-Santos and Mumford, 2005).
For example, Bassanini and Brunello (2008) using data from the European Commu-
nity Household Panel and measuring the training wage premium - for different sub-
groups of the employed population - as the differential between the median wage
growth of trained and untrained employees, find a negative and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between general training and the training wage premium.
According to these results, while workers may finance part of the investment
in their general human capital, it is difficult to argue that they represent the unique
investing subject: evidence does not seem to favor a return to Becker’s theory. Nev-
ertheless, even with imperfectly competitive labor markets efficiency cannot be ruled
out if training reduces turnover. The relatively few papers that consider this issue and
some new evidence on OECD countries will be discussed in the next section.
4. Training and turnover
The impact of training on turnover rates has received little attention in the economic
literature. This is surprising both because turnover represents an important compo-
nent of labor market outcomes and because, with imperfect labour markets, under-
standing the impact of training on turnover gives important insights for the evaluata-
tion of whether there is an under-investment problem.
The few papers that address this issue are especially based on US data and obtain
on the whole ambiguous results. Lynch (1991), using US data on young workers
(National Longitudinal Survey of Youth), finds that while on the job training (more
firm specific) reduces the probability of job separations, workers participating in off-
the-job training (more general) are more likely to leave their current employer. Veum
(1997) using the some source of data, concludes that trainees are equally likely to
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quit than non-trainees. Similar results are obtained by Krueger and Rouse (1998) fo-
cusing on personnel files from two large U.S. companies. In contrast, Parent (1999),
using data from the NLSY, shows that on the job training decreases the probability
of job separations12.
We investigate the empirical relationship between general training and turnover
using ECHP data and focusing on voluntary quits. The ECHP dataset includes two
interesting questions on turnover behaviour, which can be used to study whether (vol-
untary) turnover is affected by employer-provided training: first, workers are asked
to indicate the year when they stopped working in their previous job. Second, they
are asked to indicate the reason of separation. If we focus on individuals who were
trained by the employer between year t− 1 and year t and compute the percentage of
those who quitted between year t + 1 and year t + 2 - conditional on staying in the
job in year t - we find that the percentage of workers who leave for a better job is on
average 6.94 percent in the sample of 11 European countries with available data13.
This percentage increases to 9.88 percent when we add voluntary turnover due to
non economic reasons - such as childbearing, moving, marriage and else. Therefore,
a European employer who is considering training a worker can expect - based on this
data, that 7 to 10 trained workers out of 100 quit between one and two years after
training.
Does turnover decline among trained employees? We investigate this question by
selecting the individuals who had received employer provided general training from
January in the year t− 2 to t, the time of the survey, and by asking whether they have
quitted their last job in the year t + 1, conditional of no turnover in year t. General
training includes off the job training in vocational schools and systems providing
both work experience and complementary instruction elsewhere. We choose to focus
on turnover one year after the survey rather than in the same year to avoid the risk of
having separations taking place before the training event, and to reduce endogeneity
issues. The empirical model is
qit = α + βXit + γτi,t−1 + fi + εit (14)
where q is turnover - a dummy equal to 1 in the event of turnover and to 0 other-
wise; X is a vector of time varying controls, τ is the training dummy, c is an individual
fixed effect and ε is a random error orthogonal to training. If more able individuals
are less likely to quit and more likely to receive training, failure to account for un-
measured individual fixed effects could seriously bias downwards our estimates. To
take this into account, we estimate a linear probability model using fixed effects. The
vector X includes age, age squared, year dummies and five dummies representing the
time varying degree of job satisfaction. Table 1 reports the estimates separately for
turnover to a better job - column 1 in the table - and for any voluntary turnover -
12Brunello and De Paola (2008), using a sample of Italian firms, show that training is lower in provinces
with higher labor market density, implying that poaching may negatively affect training.
13These countries are Denmark, Belgium, France, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Austria and Finland.
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column 2. In these estimates, we consider the period 1996-2000 and restrict our at-
tention to individuals aged 25 to 54. As expected, our estimates show that turnover
declines with age and with the index of job satisfaction. Conditional on these factors,
the relationship between training and turnover is negative, small and not statistically
different from zero.
Table 1: Estimates of the probability of separation in year t + 1 as a function of
employer provided training in years t − 2 to t. Linear probability model. Fixed
effects. 1996-2000
Quitted because Quitted for
of a better job different reasons
Trained by employer between -0.003 -0.005
year t-2 and t (0.005) (0.003)
Age -0.032*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.004)
Age squared 0.0003*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Job satisfaction at time t: level 2 -0.012 -0.004
(0.012) (0.007)
Job satisfaction at time t: level 3 -0.014 -0.009
(0.010) (0.008)
Job satisfaction at time t: level 4 -0.024*** -0.020***
(0.011) (0.007)
Job satisfaction at time t: level 5 -0.044*** -0.036***
(0.010) (0.008)
Job satisfaction at time t: level 6 -0.052*** -0.038***
(0.010) (0.009)
Number of observations 52014 52014
Notes: standard errors in parentheses with ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Each regression
includes a constant and year dummies.
5. Concluding remarks
Training and education have become standard keywords in most policy proposals
dealing with unemployment, competitiveness and growth. These proposals almost
unanimously suggest that proper policies should be designed to foster more educa-
tion and more training. Are these proposals well justified on economic grounds?
Although there is a large consensus in the economic literature on the importance
of training, there is less agreement on whether the observed levels of investment in
training are efficient. This also because, even if there are many theoretical reason for
under-investment, it is very hard to find empirical evidence.
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This paper has reviewed both the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical
evidence in support of under-provision of training. It has been shown that it is diffi-
cult to find direct evidence on under-provision. The existing empirical evidence on
training costs and returns does not reach any ultimate conclusion, both because of
measurement problem, lack of data and estimation issues.
On the other hand, the indirect evidence emerging from a number of papers show-
ing that firms pay for general training, may not be particularly relevant if training
reduces turnover. In case of imperfectly competitive labor markets, the supply of
training by firms is higher than in perfect competition, because wage compression
increases profits, but the demand for training by employees is lower than in perfect
competition, because the wage gain from training is lower. As argued by Stevens,
2001, the fall in demand outweighs the increase in supply, because the employer
gains only if the employee stays on. Therefore, training is lower than in the first best
allocation even in the absence of liquidity constraints.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we have shown that results may change if
training reduces turnover rates. We have investigated this issue using the ECHP
dataset covering a large number of European countries, without reaching conclusive
results. Our estimates point to a negative but not statistically significant relationship
between training and turnover. As the theory suggests, a negative relationship can
allow private agents to attain the first best or even to over-invest in the provision of
general training.
We conclude that the empirical evidence on training under-investment is not suf-
ficient to justify on efficiency grounds training policies widespread in many OECD
countries. More needs to be done in order to understand whether market forces are
able to generate efficient levels of investments and in case of a negative answer to
understand how large is under-provision and what generates it. The identification of
market failures determining training under-provision and the understanding of those
factors producing large differences in investments realized by different groups of in-
dividuals is crucial for the design of effective policies. In addition, since public fail-
ures are also well-known, an adequate evaluation of the under-investment costs and
the intervention costs represents a crucial step before prescribing any policy. Poli-
cies diffused in many countries do not seem to be based on this kind of knowledge
and the risk of cosmetic schemes, considerable deadweight losses and substitution
effects seems to be particularly high14.
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